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PREFACE
This article considers how the greatest negotiator of the twentieth
century, Nelson Mandela, approached negotiating the unbanning of the
African National Congress (ANC), the dismantling of apartheid, and his own
freedom after twenty-seven years of imprisonment. He employed classically
good negotiation practices in the face of intense and violent opposition while
confined in prison for life. If he could be successful, why cannot lawyers
succeed when facing less daunting disputes?
19
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This article focuses on the period starting in 1985, when Mandela refused
an offer to be released if he would condemn violence, until 1990, when
President de Klerk gave his historic unbanning speech, Mandela was freed,
and he gave his first speech as a free man.

I. INTRODUCTION
Several hours after we landed in Johannesburg, we heard the news that
flashed around the globe. Nelson Mandela had passed away. With that
announcement on December 6, 2013, we became accidental eyewitnesses to
history and participants in ten extraordinary days of mourning, remembrance,
and for-learning.1 On the day of Mandelas burial, we went to the Apartheid
Museum in Johannesburg where his exceptional life was vividly presented.
The exhibit explored Mandelas life through six overarching themes:
character, comrade, leader, prisoner, negotiator, and statesman. The
negotiation theme caught my attention. In this article, I examine Mandela as a
negotiator from 1985, when he refused an offer to release him from prison if
he would denounce violence, until his release in 1990 to see what we can learn
from the greatest negotiator of the twentieth century.2
Nelson Mandelas story is one of legendary proportions. After a lifetime
as a freedom fighter, twenty-seven years in prison, and only four years after
his release, he became South Africas first democratically elected President at
the age of seventy-four years old.3 While he was known internationally as
Nelson Mandela, he was known locally as Tata, meaning the father, and
Madiba, his clan name.4
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1
Harold I. Abramson, Accidental Witness to History: My Trip to South Africa,
Scholarly Works Paper 593, DIGITAL COMMONS @ TOURO LAW CENTER (2014),
http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1678&
context=scholarlyworks.
2
See ROBERT MNOOKIN, BARGAINING WITH THE DEVIL: WHEN TO NEGOTIATE, WHEN
TO FIGHT 13435 (2010) (conferring this title).
3
NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NELSON
MANDELA 62021 (1995).
4
Names, NELSON MANDELA FOUND., https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/
page/names (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
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Nelson Mandela faced the most challenging dispute for any negotiator
a distributive one. And not just one. He faced several: he was either in or out
of prison; he either renounced the armed struggle or not; his organization, the
African National Congress (ANC), was banned or not; and majority rule was
adopted or not. The resolution of each of these issues would result in a winner
and loser, and he was determined to win each one. He also faced an agonizing
conflict of interest. He endured numerous temptations to compromise the
interests of his country to achieve his personal freedom. As I probed how
Mandela handled these distributive challenges, his distinctive negotiation
approach emerged.
To begin unpacking Mandelas approach, I examine his first speech as a
free man.5 He gave this historic speech at Cape Town City Hall to a worldwide
audience. City Hall also was the location of the first memorial service that I
attended. We listened to eyewitness recollections of that day, February 11,
1990, when Mandela was seen and spoke in public for the first time since he
was incarcerated at Robben Island at the robust age of forty-six. 6 The last
published picture of Mandela was seen in 1962 at the age of around fortyfour.7 He reappeared on the balcony of City Hall at the age of seventy-one.8
When viewed through a negotiation lens, the speech is revealing.9 His
remarks succinctly captured the arc of apartheid history, from its oppressive
5

Padraig OMalley, Remarks by Nelson Mandela in Cape Town on February 11, 1990
After his Release from Victor Verster, NELSON MANDELA FOUND.,
https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv04015/05lv041
54/06lv04191.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
6
Mandela was born on July, 18, 1918. In his autobiography, he noted that when he
was being taken on local trips, no one recognized him because his last published picture of
him was taken in 1962. See MANDELA, supra note 3, at 533.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
The speech received decidedly mixed reviews. See PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF
A MIRACLE: THE END OF APARTHEID AND THE BIRTH OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 157
(1997) (Patti Waldmeir, the journalist and author who was present at the speech, said it
was written by a committee deeply suspicious of de Klerk that had penned a speech from
hell, a speech without warmth, vision, humanity; a speech for the warpath . . . . Mandela
was a disappointment.). See MARTIN MEREDITH, NELSON MANDELA: A BIOGRAPHY 405
06 (1997) (concluding, It was a speech which raised doubts about the quality of Mandelas
leadership . . . . To whites, the speech seemed needlessly militant. To many blacks, it
seemed ambiguous . . . (was he calling for arms or negotiations?)); TOM LODGE,
MANDELA: A CRITICAL LIFE 168 (2006) (noting that Margaret Thatcher . . . expressed
dismay at the old ritual phrases . . . . de Klerk felt that for once, Mandela completely
failed to rise to the occasion. Lodge concluded that this collectively scripted statement
was not written for them. It was written to reassure Mandelas South African constituency);
ANTHONY SAMPSON, MANDELA: THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 403 (2000) (noting that he
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beginnings to his aspirations for the future, while unveiling in his words his
approach to negotiating freedom for his country and himself. For anyone
steeped in South African history, the underlying events are well known.10 The
events and speech are assessed in this article against good negotiation
practices.11

II. THE POWER OF THE BATNA
(BEST ALTERNATIVE TO A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT)
The first sentence that caught my attention called for the continuation of
the armed struggle: Our resort to the armed struggle in 1960 with the
formation of the military wing of the ANC . . . was a purely defensive action .
. . . The factors which necessitated the armed struggle still exist today. We
have no option but to continue.12
This declaration surprised and perplexed me. He made it on the day of his
release and a week after President de Klerk met all of the ANCs preconditions for negotiations in his monumental Parliamentary speech, known
as the unbanning speech.13 Violence as a strategy is spurned by professional
dispute resolvers, so to hear it advocated by one of the great peacemakers of
our time was jarring. His view contrasts starkly with the other two great
peacemakers, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., who were admired
for their abiding commitment to civil disobedience.
had to show his solidarity with the ANC because of the fears generated by the secret talks.
He needed to reaffirm the use of the tools that gave him leverage-sanctions and the armed
struggle. In Mandelas authorized biography, Anthony Sampson said that any
disappointment with the speech betrayed ignorance about Mandelas relationship with the
ANC, and his true political importance . . . .).
10
See generally MANDELA, supra note 3 (Mandelas life has been thoroughly studied
by many observers and historians, including Mandela in his thoughtful autobiography).
See also LODGE, supra note 9; MEREDITH, supra note 9; WALDMEIR, supra note 9;
SAMPSON, supra note 9; MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 10636; ALLISTER SPARKS,
TOMORROW IS ANOTHER COUNTRY (1995); F. W. DE KLERK, THE LAST TREKA NEW
BEGINNING: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1998).
11
See generally HAROLD I. ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION: ADVOCATING
AS A PROBLEM-SOLVER (3d ed. 2013) (discussing good practices. Chapter 1 compares the
two widely used negotiation approaches, positional and problem-solving and suggests how
to integrate the two into a unified approach. The chapter summarizes various negotiation
practices including the good ones along with numerous cites from key literature in the
negotiation field.).
12
OMalley, supra note 5.
13
Organisations Unbanned, NELSON MANDELA FOUND. (Jan. 1, 2015), https://
www.nelsonmandela.org/news/entry/organisations-unbanned.
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Nelson Mandela endorsed the use of violence early in his life as a freedom
fighter. But why, in what form, and for how long?
Mandela understood one of the basic tenets of negotiations: your
negotiating power is fueled by the strength of your alternative to settlement,
known as the BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement).14 He
realized that parties will negotiate when the outcome at the table will be better
than the outcome away from the table. The ANC wanted to negotiate. The
status quo away from the table was horrificcontinuation of the personally
and economically oppressive and violent apartheid policies. They had a weak
BATNA. The Nationalist Government did not want to negotiate. They
preferred the status quo away from the table. It meant that the white minority
would maintain control with all of its benefits over the majority of the
population. They had an appealing BATNA.
Mandela and the ANC needed to change the Governments alternative to
a negotiated solution. He endorsed an armed struggle in order to induce the
Government to come to the table. Mandela recognized that, [W]e could not
defeat the Government on the battlefield, but could make governing difficult
for them.15
Mandela did not begin his freedom-fighting career wedded to armed
resistance. When helping to organize the first mass demonstrations against the
new apartheid laws in 1952, Mandela adopted a nonviolent approach as a tactic
that fit the conditions.16 He arrived at this pragmatic conclusion in a committee
discussion that considered whether a policy of nonviolence was an ethical and
morally superior principle that should be unconditionally followed.17 Mandela
rejected the Gandhiam principle in a meeting that included Manilal Gandhi,
Mahatmas son. 18 Advocating for a nonviolent campaign similar to his
fathers in India, Gandhi endorsed a commitment to key Satyagraha (truthfirmness) principles of nonviolence.19 Mandela, however, saw nonviolence

14
ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 99108 (Bruce Patton ed., 2011). See MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 29
30.
15
MANDELA, supra note 3, at 520 (explaining this strategy in 1985 when he was
visited in prison by Samuel Dash, a professor of law at Georgetown University and former
counsel to the U.S. Senate Watergate Committee).
16
See id. at 12728.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
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in the Gandhian model not as an inviolable principle but as a tactic to be used
as the situation demanded . . . for [as] long as it was effective.20
Mandela took the lead in meticulously training supervisors and organizing
the nonviolent demonstrations. During the six months of demonstrations, the
organizers were proud that there was not a single act of violence by any of the
resisters due to their exemplary discipline.21
In the following year, Mandela crossed the line in his rhetoric. He
publically endorsed violent resistance in a rabble-rousing speech to a large
crowd with a pronounced police presence.22 Mandela said,
[T]hat the time for passive resistance had ended, that nonviolence was
a useless strategy and could never overturn a white minority regime
bent on retaining its power at any cost. . . . [V]iolence was the only
weapon that would destroy apartheid and we must be prepared, in the
near future, to use that weapon.23
The ANCs National Executive Committee reacted swiftly to this
unilateral pronouncement and severely reprimanded Mandela for departing
dangerously from accepted ANC policy.
At the time of his remarks, he had begun to analyze the struggle
differently:
The ambition of the ANC was to wage a mass struggle, to engage . . .
in a campaign so large and powerful that it might overcome the status
quo of white oppression. But the Nationalist government was making
any legal expression of dissent or protest impossible. I saw that they
would ruthlessly suppress any legitimate protest. . . . A police state did
not seem far away.24
He distinguished South African conditions from conditions in India:
Gandhi had been dealing with a foreign power that ultimately was
more realistic and farsighted. . . . Nonviolent passive resistance is
effective so long as your opposition adheres to the same rules as you
do. But if peaceful protest is met with violence, its efficacy is at an
20

Id. at 128.
Id. at 123, 12728, 13839.
22
Id. at 15758.
23
Id. at 157.
24
Id.
21
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end. . . . [T]here is no moral goodness in using an ineffective
weapon.25
During his later years in prison, in 1985, Mandela explained how the
conditions under which Martin Luther King and he struggled were totally
different too. 26 The United States was a democracy with constitutional
guarantees of equal rights that protected nonviolent protest . . . ; South Africa
was a police state with a constitution that enshrined inequity and an army that
responded to nonviolence with force.27
The nonviolence policy was maintained by Mandela and the ANC until
the deadly 1960 Sharpeville Massacre of black protestors.28 In response, the
ANC formed a military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (which is Zulu for Spear
of the Nation and was known as MK), and Mandela became its co-founder
and head.29 In its manifesto, MK declared:
We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means
within our power in defence of our people, our future, and our
freedom. The government has interpreted the peacefulness of the
movement as weakness; the peoples non-violent policies have been
taken as a green light for government violence . . . . Umkhonto we
Sizwe will be at the front line of the peoples defense. It will be the
fighting arm of the people against the government and its policies of
race oppression.30
In Mandelas often cited speech at the Rivonia Trial where he was sentenced
to life in prison, Mandela admitted to the use of violence and justified its use:
I do not, however, deny that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a
spirit of recklessness nor because I have any love of violence. I
planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political
25

Id. at 158, 166. See NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, WHAT GHANDI SAYS: ABOUT
NONVIOLENCE, RESISTANCE, AND COURAGE, 3245 (2012) (concluding from Gandhis
writings that while Gandhis commitment to nonviolence was primary, it was not
unconditional. Gandhi recognized exceptions based on the need for courage and selfdefense. The author also identified contradictions in his writings.).
26
See id.
27
MANDELA, supra note 3, at 52021, 568, 574.
28
See id. at 27174.
29
See id. at 280.
30
Padraig OMalley, Manifesto Of Umnkhonto we Sizwe, NELSON MANDELA FOUND.,
https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv029
18/06lv02950.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). See MANDELA, supra note 3, at 274.
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situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and
oppression of my people by whites.31
In planning MKs activities, the High Command identified four levels of
violence,32 and started with sabotage because it would cause the least harm to
human life. MK initially targeted, with handmade bombs, electric power plants
and government offices in several cities. If sabotage did not produce the
desired results, MK would move to the next stages of guerrilla warfare and
terrorism.33
Nevertheless, Mandela believed that ultimately apartheid would not be
defeated by an armed struggle; he understood its limits. It would be defeated
by negotiation. The ANC lacked the military power to remove the Nationalist
Party from governing. It could only make the country ungovernable, and
nonviolence and passive resistance alone had achieved little.34 Mandela hated
violence but was not a pacifist. . . . He understood the power of violence and
used it strategicallyto force the government to negotiate.35
Mandela could not single-handedly shape a negative BATNA for the
Government. He could not do much personally because he was incarcerated
shortly after the Sharpeville Massacre. The negative BATNA had to be forged
on multiple fronts by numerous anti-apartheid leaders and sympathizers. Much
action took place in the streets and courtrooms of South Africa and in
legislative bodies and the United Nations outside of South Africa. Each action
has been given a name in the history of the anti-apartheid movement and
encapsulates a consequential chapter of the Long Walk to Freedom.36 They
collectively formed a negative BATNA for the Government. Several of the
chapters and key leaders are mentioned here and further described in Appendix
A on the Negative BATNA for the Nationalist Government:
-1960. The Sharpeville Massacre brought global attention to the
conditions under apartheid when the police killed sixty-nine protestors
31

MANDELA, supra note 3, at 364.
See id. at 27174, 28286, 36465, 520 (explaining sabotage, guerrilla warfare,
terrorism, and open revolution).
33
See id.; MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 11718.
34
MANDELA, supra note 3, at 36465, 52021.
35
MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 135. See Mandela: Character, Comrade, Leader,
MUSEUM,
Prisoner,
Negotiator,
Statesman,
APARTHEID
http://www.apartheidmuseum.org/sites/default/files/files/downloads/theme5.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 10, 2016) (emphasizing that Bringing the apartheid regime to the negotiating
table was Mandelas guiding objective. He always made it very clear that he regarded
armed struggle as a tactic . . . .).
36
See generally MANDELA, supra note 3.
32
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within two minutesmost of whom were shot in the back as they were
fleeing. These shootings changed the landscape for fighting apartheid
as both the intensity of protests and the responses by the Nationalist
Government escalated in full view of the world.37
-1961. Umkonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) (MK), a military wing
of the ANC, was organized in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre.38
-19621964. The Rivonia Trial brought further international attention
to the oppressive apartheid conditions. The Nationalist Government
charged Mandela and other ANC leaders with sabotage, violent
revolution, and conspiracy with others. The Trial engendered much
international condemnation including from the United Nations
Security Council.39
-19691977. The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), marked by
the formation of the South African Student Organization in 1969 and
co-founded by activist Steve Biko, transformed student discontent into
a political force and shifted attention from the ANC priority on nonracialism to black pride and black self-reliance. The BCM spurred a
new era of activism in the face of aggressive clamping down by the
Nationalist Government, culminating in Bikos brutal September
1977 death in police custody.40
-1976. The Soweto Student Uprising triggered violent protests and
mass resistance to apartheid throughout South Africa. The uprising
erupted in June 1976 when high school students protested against
introduction of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction.41
-1985. Mandela rejected President Bothas offer to be released if he
would denounce violence.42
-19831990. The United Democratic Front (UDF), a coalition of
organizations, led much of the internal resistance while the ANC was
banned. The UDF, in an effort to render the country ungovernable,
mobilized people and organizations across the country. More than 600
37

Id. at 23639. See infra App. A.
See infra App. A.
39
MANDELA, supra note 3, at 36078.
40
See infra App. A.
41
Id.
42
Id.
38
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organizations joined, including labor, political, youth, womens,
religious, civic, and student and teacher organizations. The
Government believed that the UDF was created by the ANC, although
the UDF was ultimately viewed as independent.
-19601990. International sanctions and economic and political
isolation, dating back to the Sharpeville Massacre, escalated as each
chapter unfolded.43
In addition to these events, numerous anti-apartheid leaders and
sympathizers acted boldly while putting their professional and personal lives
at risk, with some paying the ultimate price for their actions. Each name is
renowned in the anti-apartheid movement. They collectively contributed
greatly to shaping the negative BATNA that Mandela understood was
essential for persuading the Nationalist Government to come to the table. Only
a few of the many courageous leaders are mentioned here, although many
more made profound contributions,44 including some under the public radar.45
-Chief Albert Luthuli was the early President of the ANC and received
the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize.46

43

Id.
For example, Judge Goldstonewhom I met when researching this articlewas a
sitting judge under apartheid laws and did what he could to interpret the laws to temper its
harshness and undermine its effects within the parameters of his judicial role. He later
became a confidant to Nelson Mandela after his release. Their friendship grew from
Goldstones activities as the Chairman of the Standing Commission of Inquiry Regarding
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation. The Commission made public
evidence that senior members of the South African Army and Police were involved with
attempts to abort the negotiation process.
45
Hundreds of people did what they could within their personal corner of the apartheid
world including participating in peaceful or violent protests, aiding someone in flight,
signing petitions, or representing victims. For example, our host, John Brand, did what he
could as a young associate with a century-old South African law firm, Bowman Gilfillan.
He was part of a small group of lawyers that represented hundreds of defendants in the
Soweto Uprising and worked with George Bizos, Mandelas personal attorney, and black
anti-apartheid leader Shun Chetty, in addition to practicing other professionally-risky legal
work for an attorney at a white-shoe law firm. In 2006, John Brand successfully
petitioned the High Court of South Africa to posthumously reinstate Shun Chetty after
Chetty had to flee the country in 1978 for his personal safety and was then disbarred for
trumped up charges that included abandoning clients.
46
See infra App. A.
44
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-Oliver Tambo helped revive the ANC in the early 1940s and lead the
ANC while in exile, while Nelson Mandela was in prison.47
-Walter Sisulu, active with the ANC, helped lead the Defiance
Campaign and transform the ANC into a mass-based militant national
organization.48
-Stephen Biko, co-founder of the Black Consciousness Movement
(BCM), did much to generate black pride and protests, as described
above, and his brutal death made him an international martyr in
opposing apartheid.49
-Winnie Mandela, Nelsons wife, was an energetic, colorful, and
controversial force in the anti-apartheid movement, especially when
her husband was in prison.50
-George Bizos was a human rights lawyer who served as Nelson
Mandelas personal attorney throughout much of his life.51
-Albie (Albert) Sachs was a human rights lawyer who participated in
the Defiance Campaign, the drafting of the Freedom Charter, and
defended people charged under apartheids racist laws.52
These people, among many others, made governing difficult and the status quo
unbearable for the Nationalist Government. The increasingly negative
BATNA spurred the Nationalist Government to reluctantly and intermittently
come to the bargaining table to talk with Mandela during his last five years in
prison.
In the Cape Town speech, Mandela tied the negative BATNA to the
negotiations when he said: We express the hope that a climate conducive to
a negotiated settlement will be created soon so that there may no longer be the
need for the armed struggle.53 After formally sanctioning an armed struggle
47

Id.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
OMalley, supra note 5. The term armed struggle is associated with the ANC
efforts, although there was a broader level of violence taking place that was not directed
by the ANC. In the rhetoric of violence, the same term had different meanings for different
48
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for almost thirty years, Mandela endorsed suspending it six months after his
release in 1990.54

III. NEGOTIATION STYLE OF NELSON MANDELA
Mandelas negotiation strategies can be classified based on three types of
negotiation practices: good practices, tactics, and tricks.55
Good practices will likely produce the best negotiated results. 56 They
include asserting interests rather than positions, acting ethically and fairly, and
building rapport, relationships, and trust on your side of the table and across
the table.57 They also include relying on rational and principled justifications,
engaging in suitable information exchanges, and using effective
communication techniques such as summarizing, paraphrasing, framing, and
questioning.58
Tactics are conventionally used, not because they are good practices, but
because they reflect customary practices. 59 Making extreme first offers to
create room for concessions, exaggerating arguments, and denigrating the
other sides arguments are examples, along with threatening to leave the
negotiation. 60 These practices are generally accepted ones that can offer
tactical benefits if they are executed convincingly. Because they are viewed as

audiences. In the Cape Town speech, Mandela likely used the term because it resonated
with his key constituency on that daythe ANC and its sympathizers. For the Nationalist
Government and many whites, they heard that Mandela was not denouncing violence,
whether generated by the ANC or any other sources.
54
In August 1990, Mandela endorsed suspending the violent struggle as a concession
to demonstrate good faith, improve the climate for negotiations, and secure target dates for
meeting particular demands of the ANC. MANDELA, supra note 3, at 586. To garner support
on his side of the table, he supported suspending, not terminating it. Id. De Klerk, in his
autobiography, viewed this concession differently. He thought that the ANC made a
common commitment towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence . . . and to
a peaceful process of negotiations, during their first negotiations in May 1990, as
expressed in the Groote Schuur Minute. DE KLERK, supra note 10, at 182.
55
ABRAMSON, supra note 11, at 2229, 4347.
56
Id. at 2526, 4344.
57
Professor Mnookin refers to negotiating as a two-level game where a party is
negotiating with people behind the table and across the table. MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at
13334.
58
See ABRAMSON, supra note 11, at App. F.
59
Id. at 2627, 4547.
60
Id. at 3637.
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generally accepted practices, if discovered, they do not severely undermine
relationships or the negotiation process, as can happen with tricks.
Tricks are neither good practices nor conventionally accepted ones. 61
Tricks are unethical and highly risky. When executed convincingly, they can
be effective. If discovered, they can severely undermine, if not destroy, the
relationship with the target and the negotiation process. Tricks can include
lying about material facts, employing such games as good guy/bad guy roles,
and arriving purposely without sufficient settlement authority.62
There is no agreed upon list of tactics or tricks. Although most people can
probably agree which moves can be labeled as tactics, people agree less on
which moves are tricks. The move needs to be assessed. The answer can
depend on the context of its use and the experience of the target. Some people
may view insufficient settlement authority as a tactic; others might see it as a
trick, as I do, for instance. If the target views the move as a trick, it can affect
whether and how the matter can be settled.
The strategies selected by a negotiator define his particular style over a
continuum of good practices, tactics, and tricks. Studies have shown that the
more negotiators engage in practices toward the good practices and tactics end
of the continuum, the more effective the negotiator can be.63

A. Good Practices
Mandela, in his Cape Town remarks and during the secret negotiations,
employed several strategies and moves that were good practices.

1. ADVOCATING INTERESTS
Mandela uncompromisingly advocated his primary interests in the
liberation of South African blacks in the face of potent temptations to sacrifice
them to meet his interest in personal liberation. An interest of a party, as
defined in the negotiation literature,64 focuses on a partys needs instead of
particular solutions that can be contested by the other side. By focusing on
interests, parties are more likely to uncover multiple solutions of which some
might be acceptable or tolerable to the other side. Mandela advocated his
primary interests while priming the other side with possible solutions that he
would prefer.
61

Id. at 2728, 4647.
Id. at 38.
63
Id. at 23.
64
FISHER & URY, supra note 14, at ch. 3.
62
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In his Cape Town speech, he firmly set out the primary interests. He spoke
about the need for a democratic, nonracial, and unitary South Africa.65 He
called for an end to white monopoly on political power and a fundamental
restructuring of our political and economic systems to ensure that the
inequalities of apartheid are addressed and our society thoroughly
democratized, including universal suffrage.66 He also repeated the interests
articulated in his speech at the 1964 Rivonia trial where he expressed how he
cherished the idea of a democratic and free society where people live together
in harmony and with equal opportunities.67
He relentlessly advocated for replacing apartheid with a democracy for
almost fifty years even as obstacles relentlessly mounted. His primary goal of
establishing a democracy has a long history dating back to his formative years
as a freedom fighter in 19431944.68 He advanced this interest in: the 1955
Freedom Charter, 69 the 1961 Manifesto establishing the military arm of
AMC,70 his famous I am prepared to die remarks at the 1964 Rivonia Trial,71
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OMalley, supra note 5.
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Nelson Mandela, Nelson Mandelas Statement From the Dock at the Opening of the
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Defense
Case
in
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Trial,
AFRICAN
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3430 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
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In 1944, Mandela helped form a Youth League for the ANC, with a manifesto that
focused on overthrowing white supremacy and establishing a truly democratic form of
government. MANDELA, supra note 3, at 98100.
69
The Freedom Charter was prepared by a committee of the National Action Council
(a coalition of diverse organizations) and reviewed by ANCs National Executive Council
in 1955. Id. at 17076. It was scheduled to be presented and subject to vote by the Congress
of the People at a convention of around 3,000 delegates. Id. The meeting attended by
Mandela was disbanded by a brigade of police before a formal vote. Id. The Freedom
Charter nevertheless lived on as an enduring political statement. Id. The Freedom Charter
provided that the people shall govern and set out multiple requirements for a democratic
South Africa including that any rights ought to be the same regardless of race, colour, or
sex. Id.
70
The 1961 Manifesto of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), which Mandela helped to draft,
stated that they were working for the winning of liberty, democracy and full national
rights and equality for all the people of this country. OMalley, supra note 30.
71
At the end of his four-hour presentation justifying why he joined the freedom
struggle, Mandela gave his famous remarks that he quoted in his 1990 Cape Town speech:
he cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons will live
together in harmony and with equal opportunities . . . . But if needs be, it is an ideal for
which I am prepared to die. OMalley, supra note 5. See Mandela, supra note 67.
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and his remarks read by his daughter when he rejected Bothas conditional
release offer in 1985.72
He encountered one of his greatest temptations to compromise his primary
interest in 1985 when President Botha offered Mandela an opportunity to be
released from prison after twenty-one years. Botha imposed only one
condition: Mandela had to publicly reject violence as a political weapon.73
This offer was made three years after Mandela was upgraded from Robben
Island, where he had slept for eighteen years on a floor mat in a tiny cell, to
Pollsmoor Prison that Mandela described as a five-star hotel when compared
to Robben Island.74 At Pollsmoor, Mandela and three of his comrades were
given the top floor with regular beds, much improved food, and considerable
freedom of movement. They were given access to a fairly wide range of
newspapers and magazines, including for the first time foreign sources like
Time Magazine and The Guardian. Mandela had his first physical contact in
twenty-one years with Winnie and his family, an especially moving and
indelible moment. 75 The authorities apparently wanted to remind Mandela
how life out of prison could be and what he was missing as they tested
negotiating with him.
Mandela rejected the conditional offer of release in a speech read by his
daughter, Zindzi, at a public rally of supporters.76 Mandela explained how this
offer was not an offer to be freed, and in doing so, he highlighted his primary
interest. He focused on what the offer would not give him when he left the
prison. His organization would still be banned. He could be arrested on a pass
offense. His wife would still be banished in Brandfort. He would need to ask
permission to live in an urban area. His own South African citizenship would
not be respected. This offer was not one to free him, he emphasized.
In confronting his conflicting interests, he prioritized freedom for
everyone else over his personal freedom:
I cherish my own freedom dearly, but I care even more for your
freedom. Too many have died since I went to prison. Too many have
suffered for the love of freedom. I owe it to their widows, to their
orphans, to their mothers and to their fathers who have grieved and
wept for them. Not only I have suffered during these long, lonely,
72

Pete Brook, Mandelas 1985 Refusal Of Release From Prison, PRISON
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See MANDELA, supra note 3, at 521.
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wasted years. I am not less life-loving than you are. But I cannot sell
my birthright, nor am I prepared to sell the birthright of the people to
be free. I am in prison as the representative of the people and of your
organisation, the African National Congress, which was banned.77
Even though this conditional offer was unambiguously rejected by Mandela,78
it was accepted by a number of other prisoners serving long jail terms for
sabotage.
The Nationalist Government continuously tempted Mandela to
compromise the nations interests to meet his personal interests, as recounted
by George Bizos, his lifelong friend and personal lawyer. Bizos was one of the
few people that had regular contact with Mandela when in prison. In an
interview with Bizos after Mandelas release, the questioner noted that
Mandela, in the 80s, was submitted to what one might describe as a series of
temptations, and one of them was the temptation of his freedom in exchange
for abandoning the armed struggle.79 George Bizos responded with:
. . . Yes. I think that the apartheid government believed its own
propaganda almost right to the end, and it's the reason why they lost
out. They believed that they could bribe Mandela in the manner in
which they had bribed the bantustan leaders. What they were saying
to him, These exiles are led by the nose by the communists and by
the Soviet Union. The people of South Africa would reject that. You
have an existence independent of this organization. You come with
us, and we will settle the matter, get some authority and we will give
some sort of qualified rights to the majority of the people, and all will
go well. They didn't know Mandela . . . This is why I think they gave
him special facilities, at Pollsmoor and at Victor Verster prisons, and
77

Id.
The backstory of this offer includes a vigorous effort by Kobe Coetsee, Bothas
Minister of Justice, to persuade Botha to not make it. He was convinced Mandela would
never accept it, and the rejection would make it difficult to fashion another way out without
looking weak. He thought asking Mandela to renounce the armed struggle would be asking
him to renounce his past, and given what Coetsee had learned about Mandela, he would
not do this. Coetsee also considered the offer one-sided. The ANC would get nothing by
sacrificing its strongest bargaining chip for Mandelas freedom. Coetsee wanted Botha to
avoid offering Mandela a negative proposal to renounce violence and instead offer a
positive one by asking Mandela to commit to a future peaceful process. See SPARKS, supra
note 10, at 4951.
79
Interview by John Carlin with George Bizos, The Long Walk of Nelson Mandela,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mandela/interviews/bizos.html
PBS,
(last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
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this is why they allowed him almost to run an office in the late 80s,
where the warder and his son did the cooking, served the meal, the
wine and gave him a telephone. That the house was locked but not to
prevent Mandela from going out, but preventing people from coming
in. And they thought that he would not have [been] able to resist this
special treatment . . . . They still believed that they would be able to
drive a wedge between Mandela and the others.80
In short, Nelson Mandela, as any skilled negotiator, understood his interests,
knew his priorities, and advocated for them.
2. UNDERSTANDING OTHER SIDES INTERESTS

Mandela also had the remarkable capacity to understand the other sides
interests, convince them he did, and find ways to meet their interests. By
definition, a negotiation can succeed only if the other side agrees to the
outcome. It is easy to be blinded to the other sides interests when occupied
with advancing your own. This blind spot may not be fatal when trying to
persuade a neutral third party judge, but it can be in a negotiation where the
other sides consent is required.
Throughout the secret prison negotiations, as described in Appendix B,
Mandela reassured the other side that he and the ANC wanted and needed the
white minority to be part of the countrys future. During the prison meetings,
Mandela made a point that is often quoted when he stressed that, [T]he
majority would need the minority. We do not want to drive you to the sea.81
In his letter to President Botha in anticipation of their first meeting, Mandela
highlighted the interests of both sides that must be met when he recognized
the need to address white South Africas concerns about the impact of majority
rule on them.82 In his first meeting with President de Klerk, there was much
discussion of ways to address each others interests, including Mandela
indicating why the Governments group rights proposal did not meet the
Governments interests.83 In response, President de Klerk said, You know, .
. . my aim is not different than yours. Your memo to P.W. Botha said the ANC
and the Government should work together to deal with white fears of black
domination . . . .84 In describing his first press conference the day after he was
freed, Mandela said:
80
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[I] wanted to impress on the reporters the critical role of whites in any
new dispensation. . . . We did not want to destroy the country before
we freed it, and to drive the whites away would devastate the nation.
I said that there was a middle ground between white fears and black
hopes . . . Whites are fellow South Africans, I said, and we want
them to feel safe and to know that we appreciate the contribution that
they have made toward the development of this country. Any man or
woman who abandons apartheid will be embraced in our struggle for
a democratic, nonracial South Africa . . . .85
Mandela worked diligently to find ways to meet the interests of the white
minority while not compromising his sides interests. His efforts to meet their
interests was facilitated by the relationships cultivated along his path toward
freedom and statesman as described in the next section.

3. BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS AND FORWARD THINKING
Mandela built rapport and relationships with a clear eye on the future
without becoming mired in past grievances and need for revenge. Mandela
cultivated connections across the table even with the most hostile and resistant
parties who were most threatened by his democratic agenda. 86 His natural
ability to do this is legendary. His instinct to do so contributed greatly to his
success in helping negotiate a democratic future for South Africa.
Many of us marvel at Mandelas ability to treat his oppressors with respect
and negotiate directly with them. In mediation parlance, he negotiated in joint
sessions, a format subject to much debate.87 A significant number of attorneys
and mediators prefer keeping parties separate because they think parties in
conflict are too angry with each other to work productively in the same room.
And, Mandela had good reason to be angry. He had been sentenced to life in
prison, confined for eighteen years in a tiny cell on Robben Island where he
lived in unbearably harsh conditions, separated from his wife, children, and
friends for twenty-seven years, and more. Mandelas ability to move past all
that and focus on the future was essential to his success.88 Focusing on the
85

Id. at 56869.
MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 13536.
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See ABRAMSON, supra note 11, at ch. 5.4.
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services that if Mandela could move forward given what he suffered under apartheid, so
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future can be necessary for resolving many sorts of disputes, as any
experienced negotiator and mediator know.
How could Mandela negotiate directly with his oppressors?
Mandelas view of the enemy helped him work with individuals who
had engaged in horrific and immoral deeds or were part of system that did so.
He viewed the enemy as the system that turned everyone against each other,
and it was that system that he hated. He concluded that, [T]he liberation
struggle was not a battle against any one group or colour, but a fight against a
system of repression.89 I wanted South Africa to see that I loved even my
enemies while I hated the system that turned us against one another.90
He also believed in the humanity of people. He thought that, [N]o one is
born hating another person because of the colour of his skin . . . . People must
learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love . .
. .91

a. Reaching out to Both Sides of the Table
In his Cape Town remarks, he reached out to build relationships with
people on his side of the table as well as across the table.92 Mandela had a large
number of people on both sides to attend to and he did.
In his first speech as a free man, he had to reestablish the confidence of
the people on his side of the table.93 Mandela had to secure credibility with the
ANC leadership and the larger body politic including blacks, coloreds,
Indians, and sympathetic whites. 94 He had to demonstrate that the twenty-

generation. Reflecting on Mandelas sacrifices, this young man was in awe that Mandela
spent more years in prisons than he had yet spent on this earth and was still able to move
forward.
89
MANDELA, supra note 3, at 620.
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Id. at 568.
91
WALDMEIR, supra note 9, at 88.
92
Professor Mnookin noted that it takes great skill for a negotiator to manage the
tension between what is going on across the table with your adversary and what is
happening behind the table among your constituents. MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 13334
(emphasis added). Behind the table, any negotiator may need to work with a client, spouse,
supervisor, members of a board of directors, a constituency, the public, and so on.
93
MANDELA, supra note 3, at 56667.
94
Colored or Coloured is a term used in South Africa to identify people of mixed
races. The label is not inherently derogatory as when used outside of South Africa. See,
e.g., Eusebius McKaiser, Not White Enough, Not Black Enough, N.Y. TIMES: LATITUDE
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seven years in prison did not break himthat he did not sell out. He thanked
a long list of specific people and groups and unqualifiedly reaffirmed his
membership and agreement with the objectives, strategies, and tactics of the
ANC.
He also reached across the table and praised President de Klerk, who
headed the government responsible for his decades of confinement. Mandela
said:
Mr. [d]e Klerk has gone further than any other Nationalist president
in taking real steps to normalise the situation . . . . It must be added
that Mr. de Klerk himself is a man of integrity who is acutely aware
of the dangers of a public figure not honouring his undertakings.95
When praising de Klerk, Mandela put at risk his fragile relationship with
people on his side of the table. Yet, he chose to elevate de Klerk as a credible
negotiating partner and send a reassuring message to the fearful white
minority, whose support he would need.96

b. Meeting with the Presidents
In prison, Mandela asked to meet with President Botha and later President
de Klerk. Mandelas recollections of those meetings remind us of the benefit
of meeting directly with the other side. Personal interactions can open up
opportunities for relationship building that may facilitate future hard
bargaining.
Mandela recalled how tense he felt about meeting with Mr. Botha. He was
known as the Great Crocodile, and Mandela had heard many accounts of
Bothas ferocious temper. 97 Mandela resolved that if Botha acted in that
finger-wagging fashion with him, Mandela would stand up and adjourn the
meeting (an unusual option for a prisoner).98 After the meeting, Mandela said,
BLOG (Feb. 15, 2012, 8:38 AM), http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/in-southafrica-after-apartheid-colored-community-is-the-big-loser/?_r=0.
95
OMalley, supra note 5.
96
Unfortunately, President de Klerk thought Mandela did not succeed across the table
because he called for continuing the armed struggle and sanctions. In his autobiography,
de Klerk thought that, [h]is message, which [had] evidently been drafted by hardline
ideologues within the ANC alliance, brought us little comfort or reason to share in the
general rejoicing. For once, Mandela failed completely to rise to the occasion. DE KLERK,
supra note 10, at 16970.
97
MANDELA, supra note 3, at 549.
98
Id. at 550.
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[H]e completely disarmed me. He was unfailingly courteous, deferential, and
friendly.99
At the end of his first meeting with de Klerk, Mandela concluded, I was
able to write to our people . . . that Mr. de Klerk seemed to represent a true
departure from the National Party politicians of the past. Mr. de Klerk . . . was
a man we could do business with.100 For seven years after his release, he had
to negotiate with de Klerk as President and then as his Deputy President.

c. Secret Negotiations in Prison
Unbeknownst to the rest of the world, Mandela negotiated with the
Nationalist Government while in prison. A special committee was formed that
included Mandela and four senior and powerful representatives of the
Government. They held the power to improve or degrade the quality of
Mandelas prison life as well as to release him.
The secret committee, that met forty-seven times beginning in 1987,101
included:102
1. Kobie Coetsee, who was the Minister of Justice and served as Chair.
He extended the first olive branch from the Government to Mandela
in 1985 when he made a surprise visit to Mandela in the hospital.
Before the committee convened, he spent time getting a sense of
Mandela by reading internal reports and meeting with people who
knew him well including George Bizos, Mandelas personal attorney,
and Winnie Mandela. In early 1986, he escorted Mandela during the
eminent persons visits where he observed Mandela greet and
interact with several dignitaries from abroad and concluded that he
could be the man.103
2. General Willemse, who was the Commissioner of Prisoners.
3. Fanie van der Merwe, who was the Director General of the Prisons
Department.
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4. Dr. Niel Barnard, who was head of the National Intelligence Service
(NIS), the agency that collected intelligence on the activities of ANC
and sympathizers. To the ANC, he was viewed as evil incarnate.104
He also was a key member of the inner circle known as the State
Security Council and protégé of President P. W. Botha. Mandela was
most disturbed by Barnards participation but decided not to object
because Mandela did not want to alienate Botha.
In these meetings, they discussed key issues familiar to everyone, although
each persons view had been shaped by his partisan bias.105 What made these
discussions new was that Mandela and the other side could discuss these issues
directly with each other. As Mandela observed, when he began the meetings
he realized that, [T]hey were the victims of so much propaganda that it was
necessary to straighten them out about certain facts . . . . I spent some time in
the beginning sketching out the history of the ANC and then explaining our
positions on the primary issues that divided [both sides].106
Three of the Government representatives significantly contributed to the
ultimate transition to majority rule. Kobie Coetsee engaged in increasingly
important roles in facilitating Mandelas release, supporting his role as leader
of the ANC, and advising Presidents Botha and de Klerk on how to work
positively with Mandela. After Mandelas release, Coetsee became one of the
key negotiators for the Nationalist Government and was elected President of
the Senate in the post-apartheid legislature.107 Dr. Niel Barnard progressively
became more deeply involved in preparing Mandela for his release including
facilitating the meeting with Botha. He also helped fashion a post-apartheid
South Africa.108 Barnard continued as head of NIS from 19791992, and then
became Director General of Department of Constitutional Development. Fanie
van der Merwe became an early and passionate convert to majority rule and
De Klerks chief constitutional advisor.109
Mandelas facility to use these opportunities and others to forge
relationships with people across the table helped build support for and trust in
Mandela to lead South Africa into a post-apartheid world. Professor Mnookin
concluded that,
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Mandela was a negotiator to whom one could make concessions and
yet maintain ones self-respect. Mandela worked hard to establish and
maintain a personal, human connection with Afrikaner leaders whose
life experiences and attitudes were radically different from his own . .
. . Waldmeir [in her book on the negotiations] concludes . . . . They
learned to trust him with their fate.110

4. LISTENING
We know that one of the greatest challenges for lawyers who are occupied
with advocating is to also listen, although any student of negotiations knows
how vital listening skills are. 111 President de Klerk recognized Mandelas
skills after the first day of post-release negotiations. He concluded, My first
impressions of Nelson Mandela were confirmed during this extended meeting.
He was a good listener . . . .112

5. APOLOGIZING
This negotiation study uncovered an apology three months after
Mandelas release when the formal post-apartheid negotiations were
commencing. Even though this study is limited until the day of his release, this
post-release event is mentioned because of how frequently the value of
apologies is dismissed. This example illustrates the benefits.
Mandela recorded that President de Klerk suggested that the system of
separate development had been conceived as a benign idea, but had not worked
in practice. For that, he said, he was sorry, and hoped the negotiations would
make amends.113
The benefits of sincere apologies in negotiation and mediations have been
the subject of multiple studies. They have focused on how to deliver an
effective apology, including assessing the impact of full and partial
apologies.114
In a full apology, the apologizer accepts complete and unconditional
responsibility for what the person did. In a partial apology, the apologizer
limits his responsibility by justifying what he did.115
110
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De Klerk offered an apology with an explanation, which makes it a partial
one. He did not take full responsibility for what happened; he apologized for
an idea that did not work out as planned. A partial apology poses risks and can
be worse than no apology when responsibility for what happened is clear or
the injury is severe. It risks exacerbating the conflict because the recipient can
resent the failure of the apologizer to take full responsibility.
Given Mandelas view that the Nationalist Government was responsible
for substantial harm, the Governments partial apology could have provoked
an antagonistic beginning for the meetings. However, Mandela reacted
positively at the time, It was not an apology for apartheid, but it went further
than any other National Party leader ever had.116
This risky partial apology might have been well received by Mandela
because he understood the historical significance of the statement and could
focus on the future. It was the first formal acknowledgment by the Nationalist
Government that apartheid was ill conceived, and it was offered at the
beginning of the formal negotiations, which presented an opportunity to fulfill
any commitment to make amends.117
116

MANDELA, supra note 3, at 579. President de Klerk never did apologize for the idea
of apartheid, only for how it was implemented. South African journalist Allister Sparks, in
his book on the negotiation process, indicated that, De Klerk still will not apologize for
apartheid, which he dismisses as simply a political mistake that had to be rectified. It began,
he insists, as an honourable vision of justiceone that would allow separate development
for white South Africans and the various black tribal groups. Only when it proved to be
unworkable did it become unjust, he says, and when we realized that we changed it. Id.
at 9192.
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At the time of this apology, it was probably unlikely a full apology would be
offered because of the political risks to de Klerks governing party that relied on
conservative white voters who were resisting change. Also, a full apology might have
undermined the partys legitimacy to stay in power and provided a basis for the victims to
seek reparations that the financially-strapped government could not afford. See Christopher
Wren, The World; South Africa and Apartheid: No Apologies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/24/weekinreview/the-world-south-africa-andapartheid-no-apologies.html. Several years later, when former President de Klerk
submitted his official submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, he put the
apartheid policies of the Nationalist party in a historical context and concluded with
another partial apology: I and many other leading figures, have already publicly
apologized for the pain and suffering caused by former policies of the National Party. . . .
I reiterate those apologies today. Padraig OMalley, Submission to The Truth And
Reconciliation Commission By Mr. F.W. de Klerk, Leader of the National Party, NELSON
MANDELA
FOUND.,
https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02167/04lv02264/05lv023
03/06lv02331/07lv02332.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). In a 2012 CNN interview
(twenty-two years after Mandelas release), de Klerk gave another partial apology when
he said, I have made the most profound apology in front of the Truth Commission and on
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These various examples of good practices by Mandela in this section are
outstanding illustrations of an effective negotiation style. In the next two
sections, I consider whether Mandela used tactics and tricks.

B. MisrepresentationGood Practice, Tactic, or Trick?
In his Cape Town speech, Mandela misrepresented to the people on his
side of the table that:
Today, I wish to report to you that my talks with the Government have
been aimed at normalizing the political situation in the country. We
have not as yet begun discussing the basic demands of the struggle. I
wish to stress that I myself had at no time entered into negotiations
about the future of our country, except to insist on a meeting between
the ANC and the Government.118
Based on Mandelas own description of what transpired in those prison
meetings, it is evident that he discussed the basic demands of the struggle
and entered into negotiations about the future of [the] country. 119 He
participated in multiple meetings, including ones with Presidents Botha and
de Klerk where he discussed in detail the four basic issues dividing the ANC
and Government.120
He might have been able to contend technically that he never entered into
negotiations because he never agreed to anything or endorsed any
compromises. However, I doubt these lawyerly distinctions would have been
persuasive to the public.
Furthermore, when Mandela initially reached out to the Government and
agreed to meet with the special government committee while in prison, he
other occasions about the injustices wrought by apartheid. He also stated, What I havent
apologized for is the original concept of seeking to bring justice to all South Africans
through the concept of nation states (essentially creating two states, one black and one
white). But in South Africa it failed. And by the end of the 70s, we had to realize, and
accept and admit to ourselves that it had failed. Lucky Gold, De Klerk: No Animosity
with Mandela, CNN AMANPOUR BLOG (May 10, 2012, 9:13 PM),
http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/10/de-klerk-no-animosity-with-mandela/. When
asked if apartheid failed because it was unworkable or morally repugnant, he offered three
reasons why apartheid turned out to be unworkable. He did not condemn a policy of
apartheid as morally repugnant. Id.
118
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119
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avoided telling his colleagues in prison what he had already done when
inquiring whether he should initiate negotiations. Mandela said, I chose to
tell no one of what I was about to do.121 Mnookin euphemistically described
Mandela as shading the truth and as resolving the quandary in the usual
way, with partial (and misleading) disclosures to his ANC prison mates.122
Two weeks after his speech, Mandela met with the ANC leadership and
candidly disclosed for the first time the nature of the secret talks with the
Government. In Mandelas own words: I described the demands I had made,
and the progress that had been achieved.123 When making these disclosures,
Mandela knew he had to prove he had not sold out the ANC while in prison.
ANC members had heard reports of Mandelas private conversations with the
Government, were aware of his prison upgrades, and were concerned that
Mandela had been out of touch with what was happening on the ground since
1964. This disclosure was a critical one for Mandela as a negotiator who
wanted to establish the trust of the people on his side of the table after being
absent for so long. Apparently he was successful. At the meeting, they elected
him deputy president of the ANC.124
Was this misrepresentation a negotiation trick? Misrepresentations are
typically a hallmark of a trick, with high risks of harm if discovered. Even
though he made a false statement, I do not think this negotiating behavior was
a trick. Mandela unilaterally concluded that the misstatement could be justified
because the secret meetings were for the benefit of the ANC and its members.
He said that,
I knew my colleagues . . . would condemn my proposal [to meet with
government representatives], and that would kill my initiative even
before it was born. There are times when a leader must move out ahead
of his flock, go off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his
people the right way.125
If the negotiating behavior can be justified, can it be classified as a good
practice? I do not think so because it risked undermining trust in Mandela and
the negotiation process he had been participating in. The misrepresentation
revealed that Mandela was capable of being deceitful when he thought it could
be justified. A good practice is to reliably tell the truth. Good practices like
effective listening, being ethical, advocating for interests, and so forth rarely
need to be justified to others.
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Was this misstatement a tactic that could be viewed as generally
accepted behavior with moderate risks if discovered? Misrepresentations that
are generally accepted conventions in negotiations are exempted under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association, for
instance. The Rules treat as non-material misrepresentations estimates of
price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a partys intentions as
to an acceptable settlement of a claim.126 Mandelas particular misstatement
would not qualify for an ABA-type exemption, of course.
This misrepresentation was a misstatement of objective fact that could be
considered material. Material misrepresentations are typically viewed as
tricks. A material fact is one that the listener will likely attach importance to
and influence the listeners choice or decision. 127 Mandela had reason to
believe that his supporters would regard this statement as important when
determining their choice to support him at the Cape Town celebration of his
release. The misstatement reassured people on Mandelas side of the table that
he did not make any concessions in private negotiations on behalf of the
freedom struggle.
If he had made an accurate representation that the secret negotiations were
substantive and that he made no concessions, the statement might have
generated suspicions that Mandela was not being honest without knowing
more. They might have wondered whether he had discussed the issues most
important to them or made concessions that were inadequately vetted. A brief,
accurate representation might have risked hurting the liberation struggle on
Mandelas first day of freedom when confidence in his leadership was so vital
for moving toward.
One way for a negotiator to test whether his move is a tactic or trick is to
inquire how he would react if someone made the misrepresentation to him.
Presumably Mandela considered this perspective when choosing to make this
misstatement and deferring disclosure until he had an opportunity to explain
the benefits to the ANC leadership. By the ANC leadership reaffirming their
confidence in him when electing him to a leadership position, the ANC
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apparently viewed the material misrepresentation as acceptable or tolerable
and therefore as a tactic.

C. Prepared to Die Good Practice or Tactic?
Mandelas concluding remarks at the Rivonia Trial illustrated the
difference between good practices and tactics. Mandela gave his often-cited I
am prepared to die remarks when he and the other defendants were being
tried for treason.128 Mandela was not only facing the death sentence, he was
convinced it would be imposed.129 At the end of his four-hour presentation
justifying why he joined the struggle, he gave his famous remarks that he also
quoted in his Cape Town speech.
His concluding remarks were:
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the
African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have
fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a
democratic and free society in which all persons will live together in
harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal for which I hope
to live for and to achieve. But, if needs be, it is an ideal for which I
am prepared to die.130
In the 1964 Rivonia Trial, the claim was probably a good practice. He wanted
to convince people that he was so committed to achieving democratic ideals
that he was prepared to be a martyr. In any negotiations, a party not only should
clearly express his priorities; a party needs to convince the other side that the
priorities are his real ones in order to be taken seriously.
When Mandela repeated the quote on the day of his prison release, the
same claim was probably a tactic. He wanted to persuade others that he was as
committed to his goals that day as he was more than twenty-seven years
earlier. This time, the claim was probably pufferya conventional practice of
128
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exaggerating claims to make a point. I doubt that Mandela or anyone believed
Mandela wanted to be a martyr at this juncture. He employed a rhetorical
phrase to demonstrate that he was still dedicated to the cause of democracy.

D. Win-Win Resolution?
President de Klerk stunned the country and the world on February 2, 1990,
when he gave his momentous unbanning speech. 131 He announced at the
opening session of Parliament that the Government would meet key
preconditions for negotiations set by Mandela and the ANC. President de
Klerk unilaterally rescinded the ban against ANC and other organizations,
released political prisoners, and made other moves designed to normalise the
political process. 132 He laid the groundwork for a new constitution under
which every person will enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in
every sphere of endeavourconstitutional, social, and economic. 133 He
announced that, "The agenda is open . . . . Among other things, those aims
include a new, democratic constitution; universal franchise; no domination;
equality before an independent judiciary; the protection of minorities as well
as of individual rights . . . .134
He gave particular attention to stopping the violencea key feature of the
Governments negative BATNA. He stated that he was moving away from
measures which have been seized upon as a justification for confrontation and
violence.135 Our country and all its people have been embroiled in conflict,
tension and violent struggle for decades. It is time to break out of the cycle of
violence and break through to peace and reconciliation.136 He went on to say
that, Without conceding that violence has ever been justified . . . [t]he
justification for violence which was always advanced, no longer exists. . . .
[T]here is no longer any reasonable excuse for the continuation of violence.137
He also addressed sanctions, another key component of the Governments
negative BATNA, when he called on the international community to re-
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evaluate its position and to adopt a positive attitude towards the dynamic
evolution which is taking place in South Africa.138
And he made the announcement that everyone was waiting for but on
terms not anticipated. He declared that, I wish to put it plainly that the
Government has taken a firm decision to release Mr. Mandela
unconditionally.139
Analysis of Resolution
Mandela achieved an impressive negotiated outcome when you consider
that Mandela prevailed on each distributive issue: he was unconditionally
released without renouncing violence, the ANC and other organizations were
unbanned, and de Klerk announced an agenda for forming a post-apartheid
government. Mandela did not make a single concession in the secret
negotiations.
Mandela reached this result in the face of temptations to compromise and
make concessions. Mandelas appetite for liberty was strategically whetted
beginning in 1982 when he was transferred out of Robben Island. He was
exposed to snippets of life outside of prison including an improving standard
of living, road trips, physical contact with family members, and social and
professional interactions with friends and colleagues. He nevertheless
negotiated with an unwavering eye on his primary interestthe liberation of
his country over his personal liberation.
Is this a case study where only one sides interests were met? Did Mandela
win? 140 Did de Klerk capitulate and the Nationalist Government receive
nothing? It might appear so. Mandela did have a strong bargaining position by
1990 because he had become an internationally revered leader in prison while
the Nationalist Government had an unbearable BATNA.
A closer examination of the results suggests that this outcome met
significant interests of the Government (and the white minority it represented).
First, the resolution opened the door toward political and economic
stability including the Government rejoining regional and global communities
of public and economic affairs. The country had become ungovernable, and
apartheid policies had made South Africa an international pariah. A dramatic

138

Id.
See id. One week later, de Klerk met with Mandela to inform him that he would be
released the next dayunconditionally. Mandela walked out of prison with Winnie by his
side and went to Cape Town City Hall to give his first speech as a free man. MANDELA,
supra note 3, at 55758.
140
SAMPSON, supra note 9, at 396. Sampson concluded that after the unbanning
Mandela had won. Id.
139

48

NELSON MANDELA AS NEGOTIATOR

move of liberalization would likely win necessary diplomatic support from
conservative administrations in London and Washington, D.C.
President de Klerk opened the door by making two essential
commitments: the unsurprising decision to release Mandela and the
sensational commitment to dismantle apartheid and move toward a new form
of democratic government.
While de Klerks commitment to release Mandela was specific and
unconditional, his commitment to dismantling apartheid was only in principle.
He did not commit to any details, which he left open for later negotiations.
He laid out the governments lofty and broad guidelines for the future
while emphasizing that he was refraining from discussing the merits of
numerous political questions that would soon be debated and subject to
multilateral negotiations. He put on the agenda an analysis of various models
of democratic constitutions without committing to a particular model. He put
on the agenda the issues of no domination and the need to protect individual
and minority rightscode terms for protecting the white minority. He put on
the open agenda an aim for universal franchise, a more ambiguous term
than majority rule demanded by Mandela. Universal franchise is associated
with a right to vote regardless of race and gender, although the term left
unclear what the vote would be for and whether white and black voters would
be treated as equals.
At the time of the speech, de Klerk privately planned to share power with
blacks, subject to an effective white veto, not to hand it over.141 After the
speech, he persisted in trying to fashion a power-sharing scheme based on
groups rights in the new Constitution. He had no intention of negotiating the
National Party out of power.142
In his autobiography, de Klerk made clear what he wanted to achieve with
the announcement:
We had prepared a comprehensive media strategy to ensure the speech
received maximum favourable publicity . . . . We had succeeded in
catching the media, the political opposition and the world completely
by surprise . . . . We had achieved our objective of convincing our
friends and foes alike that the National Party had made a paradigm
141
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shift . . . . Within the scope of eight days [the date of the speech and
the later announcement that Mandela would be released the next day],
we had succeeded in dramatically changing global perceptions of
South Africa.143
Second, the announcement gave the Government what it perceived as the
moral high ground by calling to halt the violence including removing any
excuses for engaging in violence. You will recall that Mandela had rejected
earlier calls for suspending the armed struggle.
Third, the announcement gave the Government a negotiating partner,
Nelson Mandela. The Nationalist Government needed a black leader that it
could work with and who might be able to lead the black majority while
decreasing the likelihood of a civil war. As far back as 1981 when Kobie
Coetsee became Minister of Justice, an internal background report he
requested described Mandela as a practical and pragmatic thinker with
capacity for integrated and creative thought who maintains outstanding
personal relations . . . and always behaves in a friendly and respectful way
towards figures of authority.144 It concluded that: There exists no doubt that
Mandela commands all the qualities to be the Number One black leader in
South Africa.145 This assessment was corroborated by the relationships and
trust that Mandela developed with members of the secret committee during the
forty-seven meetings. The accounts of those meetings showed how Mandela
tried to establish a personal link with each member of the
committee.146The accounts also revealed that the Government representatives
learned much about how Mandela approached key substantive issues that
divided them including his understanding of the need to engage the white
minority in any post-apartheid South Africa. After de Klerks first meeting
with Mandela, de Klerk noted that he took his [Mandelas] measure while he
spoke. I think we both reached more or less the same conclusion: that it would
be possible for us to do business with each other.147
The Government helped prepare Mandela for this daunting leadership role
by acclimating and educating Mandela about the world he would be re-joining
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when the Government upgraded his prison facilities, gave him access to mass
media and people, and took him on field trips.
The appropriate choice of Mandela has not only been proven by history,
it has been validated by Mandelas own description of the importance of his
relationship with de Klerk. When commenting on receiving jointly the 1993
Nobel Peace Prize, he said, To make peace with an enemy one must work
with that enemy, and that enemy becomes ones partner. 148 Mandela
confessed to friends, My worst nightmare is that I wake up one night and that
de Klerk isnt there. I need him. Whether I like him or not is irrelevant, I need
him.149
This deal like any negotiated resolution met the interests of both sides
sufficiently for it to be done, although without a formal signing of an
agreement. As illustrated throughout this article, Mandela achieved this result
by relying primarily on good negotiation practices.
Postscript: 19901994
This study focused on Mandela as the chief negotiator when in prison
although many other people were also participating in the negotiations on
Mandelas side of the table. After Mandelas release and the negotiations
became public, arduous and agonizing negotiations still laid ahead. The next
stage began as more people came to both sides of the table and the parties
moved from broad principles to the details of how a post-apartheid democratic
government would be fashioned and function. The bitter and complex
negotiations proceeded in a brutal environment of violent and deadly conflicts
between whites and blacks as well as between different black political factions.
The negotiations took place across the table as well as behind the table with
deep divisions of how to proceed among whites and among blacks. It ended
after the elections on May 2, 1994, when Mr. de Klerk made his concession
speech and May 10, when Nelson Mandela was sworn in as the new,
democratically elected President of South Africa, with de Klerk as his Deputy
President.150

IV. CONCLUSION
Nelson Mandela illustrated the use of good negotiation practices in this
exceptional negotiation from 19851990 over the decision to dismantle
148
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apartheid and free him. So what did Mandela teach us new about how to
negotiate? Nothing. He did what any good negotiator should do.
Mandela followed a textbook approach, although it is unlikely that he read
any of the classics in negotiation like Getting to Yes. Mandela
uncompromisingly advocated interests, convincingly addressed the other
sides interests, helped shape an unattractive alternative to negotiations for the
Nationalist Government, and consistently engaged in good negotiation
practices with some tactics. And, the negotiation produced a result that
significantly met both sides interests when he was released.
Mandela and de Klerk, for their negotiation achievements including after
1990, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their work for the peaceful
termination of the apartheid regime, and for the laying the foundations for a
new democratic South Africa.151
At the main international memorial service for Mandela, President Obama
delivered a stirring speech that highlighted practices of Mandelas that are
commonly associated with good negotiating.152 Obama said that Mandela
taught us the power of action, but . . . also . . . ideas; the importance
of reason and arguments; the need to study not only those you agree
with, but those who dont . . . . Mandela understood the ties that bind
the human spirit. There is a word in South AfricaUbuntua word
that captures [his] greatest gift: his recognition that we are all bound
together . . . .153
Professor Robert Mnookin when labeling Mandela as the greatest negotiator
of the twentieth century concluded that, Mandela understood that the goal
of negotiation is to persuade your adversaries. He ultimately achieved through
negotiation an outcome that could never have been accomplished solely
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through violence or resistance. Moreover, he did this without making any
concessions with respect to his core political beliefs.154
Can we learn anything from Nelson Mandela as a negotiator? Yes. His
negotiation story offers compelling evidence for anyone who is not persuaded
that these negotiation practices are effective. If Mandela could use these
techniques successfully when facing the complex, heated, and intractable
distributive conflicts in South Africa, lawyers and people in conflict should
confidently use them when resolving routine disputes.155
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APPENDIX A: NEGATIVE BATNA FOR THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT
These events and people helped induce the Government to come to the
negotiating table by making no agreement unattractive and unacceptable. They
did much to shape the Governments negative BATNA (Best Alternative to a
Negotiated Agreement).
Events
-1960. Sharpeville Massacre brought global attention to the
conditions under apartheid when the police killed sixty-nine protestors
within two minutesmost of whom were shot in the back as they were
fleeingand wounded another four hundred people. Several thousand
protestors, as part of a massive anti-pass campaign, had showed up at
a local police station without their passes and a riot broke out. After
the Sharpeville Massacre, the ANC organized a nationwide protest
strike that included the public burning of passbooks by Mandela and
many leaders. The government declared a state of emergency,
suspended habeas corpus and banned the ANC. The landscape for
fighting apartheid changed in one day as both the intensity of protests
and the responses by the Nationalist Government escalated in full
view of the world.156
-1961. Umkonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) (MK), a military wing
of the ANC was organized in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre to
engage in armed struggle and endured for the next thirty years.
Mandelas early leadership in MK contributed to his life
imprisonment conviction. He continued to endorse the work of MK
until almost six months after his release.157
-19621964. The Rivonia Trial brought further international attention
to the oppressive apartheid conditions. The Nationalist Government
charged Mandela and other ANC leaders with sabotage, violent
revolution, and conspiracy with others, including foreign states.
Mandela, convinced that he and the other defendants would be
sentenced to death, decided not to defend himself. He chose to use the
trial as a platform to publicize the cause for freedom. Mandela waived
his right to present direct testimony and appeal any conviction.
Instead, he read a carefully prepared four-hour statement from the
156
157
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dock. He surprised the prosecution by admitting key charges and
spending most of his time justifying the actions by MK and ANC and
why he shifted from nonviolent to violent approaches. The Trial
engendered much international condemnation including by the United
Nations Security Council.158
-19691977. Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) marked by the
formation of the South African Student Organization in 1969 and cofounded by activist Steve Biko, transformed student discontent into a
political force and shifted attention from the ANC priority on nonracialism to black pride, black self-reliance, black psychological
liberation, and black leaders
Through a movement based on black power, blacks actively opposed the
apartheid government during the 1970s. The Movement spurred a new era of
activism in the face of aggressive clamping down by the Nationalist
Government, culminating in Bikos brutal September 1977 death in police
custody. His death attracted international attention and unleashed new protests
within and outside of South Africa.159
-1976. Soweto Student Uprising triggered violent protests and mass
resistance to apartheid throughout South Africa. The uprising erupted
in June 1976 when high school students protested against introduction
of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction. This language of the
governing white minority was viewed as the language of the
oppressor. Resistance was brewing aided by the Black Consciousness
Movement along with other developments. The violence on the first
day spread quickly and casualties mounted for the rest of the year. The
Uprising provoked an international outcry that was fueled by the now
iconic photograph of the dying 12-year-old Hector Pieterson being
carried by a distressed fellow student. The Governments forceful
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repression of protests exposed the Governments disintegrating ability
to govern.160
-1985. Mandela Rejected President Bothas Offer to be released if
Mandela would denounce violence. Botha made this conditional offer
to Mandela after twenty-one years of confinement, as violence reigned
in South Africa, pressure mounted abroad, and the country became
barely governable. Botha presented the proposal in Parliament and
tried to put the onus of violence on Mandela as well as his fate when
Botha said that it is no longer the South Africa government which
now stands in the way of Mr. Mandelas freedom. It is he himself.161
This offer was the sixth conditional offer for his release in ten years.
Mandelas daughter, Zindzi, read Mandelas reply at a public rally. It was
the first time Mandelas words were legally heard in more than twenty years.
Mandela not only refused to reject violence, he unambiguously justified the
benefits of an armed struggle by the ANC, explaining that other forms of
resistance were unavailable. He then shifted the onus of violence to Botha
when he called on him to renounce violence and dismantle apartheid.
-19831990. United Democratic Front (UDF), a coalition of
organizations, did much to make South Africa ungovernable while the
ANC was banned.162 The UDF was formed in response to President
Bothas initiative to form a tricameral parliament, in which coloureds,
Indians, and whites would vote separately for racially segregated
houses of parliament.163
The majority of Africans would be put into Bantustans or independent
homelands, where they would be allowed to vote only for a national
government in that Bantustan.164The UDF mobilized people and organizations
160
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across the country and called for the creation of a united, non-racial, nonsexist, and democratic South Africa.165
More than 600 organizations from across South Africa, including labor,
political, youth, women, religious, civic, and student and teacher
organizations, 166 joined the UDFs movement to oppose the apartheid
government and its policies.167 The National Executive Committee stated, the
strength of the UDF lies in the democratic nature of its composition . . . . These
organizations represent people of all colours and creeds from all strata of South
African society.168 The UDF organized consumer boycotts and stay-aways, a
one million signature campaign to oppose the new proposed form of
government, and created local structures which played key roles in the
political education and mobilization of the masses, among other things.169
The Government believed that the ANC created the UDF170 and therefore
restricted it, including subjecting the organization to the state of emergency
and its members to arrests. However, UDF ultimately was not viewed as a
creation of or controlled by the ANC. 171 From the outset it was clear that the
UDF preferred to be the heir, rather than a clone, of the ANC.172
-19601990. International Sanctions and Economic and Political
Isolation, dating back to the Sharpeville Massacre, escalated as each
momentous chapter unfolded. The negative impact of the sanctions
was evident when in early discussions after Mandelas release, de
Klerk asked Mandela to mute the call for the continuation of
165
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international sanctions. Mandela thought that in our view
sanctions remained the best lever to force him to do more.I
explained to Mr. de Klerk that we could not tell our supporters to relax
sanctions until he completely dismantled apartheid and a transitional
government was in place.173
The United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council adopted
a succession of resolutions that condemned apartheid and progressively
isolated South Africa. The first Security Council resolution, in 1960,
denounced the actions of the South Africa government in the wake of the
Sharpeville Massacre and called for abandonment of apartheid and racial
discrimination. Several years later, the General Assembly and the Security
Council, with Great Britain, U.S., France, and Brazil abstaining, urged South
Africa to end the Rivonia Trial and grant amnesty to the defendants. Over
twenty-nine years, resolutions called for arms embargo, oil embargos,
suspending cultural, educational, sporting, and other exchanges, voiding South
Africas racist constitution, and negotiating to end apartheid, with the last
resolution adopted two months before Mandelas release.174
Through a string of resolutions and decisions by the General Assembly,
the UN also effectively removed South Africa from UN membership from
1970, when it would not approve the credentials of the South African
delegation, until June 1994, when it formally approved them.175
Anti-apartheid boycott and disinvestment campaigns took hold in the
United States in the 1970s and 1980s as well as in the United Kingdom and
173
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other nations. The U.S. campaigns induced U.S. campuses, cities, and states
to disinvest in companies doing business in South Africa. In 1986, the U.S.
federal government joined the boycotts when Congress overrode President
Reagans veto and banned new investment and bank loans in South African
businesses, barred a range of imports, imposed embargos on particular exports
like oil and munitions, and cancelled landing rights.176
People
In addition to these significant events, as pointed out in the text of this
article, numerous anti-apartheid leaders and sympathizers acted boldly and at
great personal risk to inflict a negative BATNA. Only a few of the courageous
leaders are mentioned here, although many more made profound contributions
including people below the public radar screen.
-Chief Albert Luthuli became President of the ANC in 1952 and
moved the organization into a more activist role as the Defiance
Campaign spread. He was awarded the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize for his
role in the nonviolent struggle against apartheid. He was the first
African and also the first person from outside Europe to be awarded
the prize.177
-Oliver Tambo helped revive the ANC in the early 1940s and opened
a law practice with Nelson Mandela. When banned, he became a
Mission in Exile and a central ANC leader. He actively built support
for the ANCs cause in Africa, United Kingdom, Russia, China, the
U.S., and with political and business leaders around the world. He led
the ANC in exile while Nelson Mandela was in prison.178
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south-africa (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); Arianna Lissoni, The Anti-Apartheid Movement,
Britain and South Africa: Anti-Apartheid Protest vs Real Politik, AFRICAN NATL CONG.,
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5695 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); The Anti-Apartheid
Movement of the 1960s, FORWARD TO FREEDOM, http://aamarchives.org/history/1960s/79history/124-the-anti-apartheid-movement-in-the-1960s.html# (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
177
Chief Albert John Luthuli, SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE,
http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/chief-albert-john-luthuli (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
178
Oliver
Reginald
Tambo,
SOUTH
AFRICAN
HISTORY
ONLINE,
http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/oliver-reginald-tambo (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).

59

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 31:1 2016]

-Walter Sisulu, active with ANC early, helped lead the Defiance
Campaign and transform the ANC into a mass-based militant national
organization. He worked with Nelson Mandela and others to form MK
and became part of its High Command as political commissar when
Mandela became its Commander in Chief. Along with Mandela, he
was sentenced to life in prison in the Rivonia Trial and sent to Robben
Island. He became part of the underground political leadership at
Robben Island, known at the High Organ.179
-Stephen Biko, co-founder of the Black Consciousness Movement
(BCM), did much to generate black pride and protests as described
above under the Events section and his brutal death made him an
international martyr in opposing apartheid.180
-Winnie Mandela, Nelsons wife, was an energetic force in the antiapartheid movement, especially when her husband was in prison.
During President Bothas regime, her opposition earned her the title
of the Mother of the Nation. For her activities, she was tortured,
harassed, banned, separated from her children, held in solitary
confinement for eighteen months, and exiled to a remote area of South
Africa. She also was controversial among sympathisers. She endorsed
the practice of necklacing (burning people alive using tires and petrol)
and was charged with ordering her body guards, known as Mandela
United Football club, to kidnap and murder suspected police
informers including 14-year-old Stompie Seipei, the most notorious
case.181
-George Bizos, a human rights lawyer served as Nelson Mandelas
personal attorney throughout much of his life. He co-represented
Mandela in the Rivonia Trial. As his attorney, he was one of the few
people who could visit Mandela when in prison and as a result was a
vital link between Mandela and the outside world.182
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-Albie (Albert) Sachs, human rights lawyer who participated in the
Defiance Campaign, helped draft the Freedom Charter, and defended
people charged under apartheid racist laws. He worked closely with
Oliver Tambo. He was banned, subject to solitary confinement
without trial, and went into exile in 1966. In 1988, when a car bomb
was planted by South African police, he lost an arm and sight in one
eye. He was one of the chief architects of the post-apartheid
constitution and was appointed by Mandela to serve on the newly
established Constitutional Court.183
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APPENDIX B: THE SECRET PRISON NEGOTIATIONS
Nelson Mandelas represented in his remarks at Cape Town when he was
released that:
Today, I wish to report to you that my talks with the government
have been aimed at normalizing the political situation in the country.
We have not as yet begun discussing the basic demands of the
struggle. I wish to stress that I myself had at no time entered into
negotiations about the future of our country, except to insist on a
meeting between the ANC and the Government.184
The Secret Negotiations
As concluded in the text, Mandelas statement misrepresented that he had
not entered into negotiations with the Government while in prison. This
conclusion is supported by the description of the secret negotiations in this
Appendix.
During the early 1980s, the Government began sending feelers to release
Nelson Mandela if he would meet particular conditions including denouncing
violence. The Government seemed to be testing Mandela in order to learn what
he was willing to trade for his freedom. The feeler that morphed into the secret
prison negotiations was extended by Kobie Coetsee, the Minister of Justice, in
1985.185
Coetsee briefly visited Nelson Mandela in a Cape Town hospital when he
was hospitalized for a routine surgical medical procedure for an enlarged
prostate. Coetsees visit was unexpected and amazed Mandela because
Coetsee had not responded to Mandelas prior written efforts to set up talks
between the ANC and the Government. The cordial and informal exchange in
the hospital was viewed as a signal by Mandela. He thought that, The
government, in its slow and tentative way, was reckoning that they had to

184
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come to some accommodation with the ANC. Coetsees visit was an olive
branch.186
When Mandela was discharged from the hospital, officials did not return
him to the shared facilities with his three comrades in Pollsmoor prison.
Instead, he was moved into a ground floor section in the prison, with three
rooms and a separate toilet for his exclusive use. For the first time since being
incarcerated, he was isolated, and by prison standards, living in palatial
conditions. He realized that these new circumstances gave him the freedom to
try initiating discussions with the Government, and he could do so
confidentially.
Mandela recognized that both the ANC and the Government had imposed
firm preconditions for negotiating that have made any offers by either side a
sign of weakness and betrayal. He was facing a too common obstacle in
negotiations and one that can be intractable. Something bold had to be done.
Mandela launched a risky strategy especially for a leader known for his
transparency and integrity.
Within a few weeks, Mandela secretly reached out to the Government by
writing to Kobie Coetsee to propose talks about talks. When he did not
186
Id. at 524. This pivotal visit has an interesting backstory. For Mandela, it was a
total surprise, but for Coetsee, the visit was the result of two fortuitous circumstances that
Mandela apparently was unaware of. A good friend of Coetsee, Piet de Waal, had
serendipitously become friends with Winnie Mandela. De Waal and Coetsees friendship
dates back to their days at the University of Orange Free State. They lived in the same
housing and played tennis when attending the University. De Waal later persuaded Coetsee
to abandon his plans to become a teacher to go to law school and then helped Coetsee
secure his first law position as an articled clerk. De Waal decided to become a small-town
lawyer and moved to Brandfortthe same remote village that Coetsees predecessor,
Minister of Justice Kruger, later banished Winnie to. De Waals wife and Winnie became
close friends, and Piet de Waal, as the only attorney in town, reluctantly represented
Winnie locally after he was told that he was ethically obligated to do so and had advised
local authorities of his predicament. To protect his friend from harassment, Coetsee
vouched for de Waals integrity with Kruger. When Coetsee became Minister of Justice in
1980, de Waal began to lobby him cautiously and persistently to lift the ban on Winnie and
consider releasing Nelson from prison. This was the first lobbying of a cabinet minister
by anyone within the Afrikaner nationalist fold, and Coetsee admits today that it had a
considerable influence on him. You could say thats where the whole process started, he
says. SPARKS, supra note 10, at 19. The second fortuitous event occurred on a plane to
Cape Town when Winnie Mandela was on her way to visit her husband in the hospital.
Coetsee was on the same flight. He visited Mrs. Mandela in coach class to assure her of
the Governments concern for her husbands health. Winnie then marched up to business
class and sat next to Coetsee; they talked for much of the two-hour flight. By the time the
flight arrived, Coetsee decided to visit Mandela in the hospital. Id. at 1425.
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respond, Mandela looked for other opportunities to reach out to the
Government.
He did not tell anyone in the ANC what he was doing because he thought
that they would object. He justified this daring move by concluding that
sometimes a leader must move out ahead of his flock . . . .187
As he was making overtures to the Government and some preliminary
connections, Oliver Tambo and the ANC called for the people to render the
country ungovernable.188 The people did what they could do. The state of
unrest and political violence were reaching new heights and international
pressure was increasing. The Government responded by imposing a state of
emergency.189
Concurrently, the Government made another inconceivable change in
Mandelas prison life. Without any warning or explanation in 1986, prison
officials started taking Mandela on short trips to see the city and countryside.
He suspected that the trips were designed to entice him with the pleasures of
small freedoms in order to induce him to make compromises to gain complete
freedom. The trips also might have been designed to acclimate him to life in
South Africa after his release.
For the first trip, he was driven around Cape Town. He became riveted
watching people doing simple and normal activities of daily life and
discovered how much he missed doing them. When the Colonel driving him
around went into a store to buy Mandela a cold drink, he encountered another
first in his twenty-two years of confinement. He was out of prison and
unguarded. He anxiously envisioned the possibilities of escaping. Then, he
realized that it would be unwise, irresponsible, and dangerous, and that they
were probably testing him. He was relieved when the Colonel returned. Over
the next several months, he visited Cape Town, the outskirts, the nearby
mountains, and local beaches. No one recognized him. The last published
picture of Mandela in South Africa dated back to 1962 when he was 44 years
old. He was now 68 years old.190
Later in 1987, Mandela resumed contact with Coetsee. They met privately
several times and then Coetsee made a concrete proposal to appoint a small
committee of senior officials to conduct secret discussions with Mandela.
Coetsee would head the committee. Although Mandela was uncomfortable
with and unhappy that the chief of intelligence services, Niel Barnard, would
be on the committee, he accepted the proposal.191
187
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Next, Mandela consulted behind the table. He conferred with his four
prison comrades, known as the High Organ (leadership) about initiating talks
with the Government but he did not inform them that he had already reached
out, a government committee had been formed, and he had agreed to
participate. Two of his comrades objected to him initiating talks, as he feared.
As these events were unfolding, he received a note from Oliver Tambo in
Lusaka, Zambia about rumors that secret meetings were being held. Mandela
assured him that he was only negotiating to set up a meeting between the ANC
and the Government, when he was actually doing much more.
Mandela thought he had to act alone because my colleagues . . . would
condemn my proposal, and that would kill my initiative even before it was
born, 192 especially when the meetings included the head of the national
intelligence services. Mandela thought it was time to make some hard and
risky choices. Mandela believed that There are times when a leader must . . .
go off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his people the right
way.193
The first secret meeting was held in May 1988. The meetings were initially
conducted weekly, then sporadically, and eventually returned to meeting
weekly, for a total of forty-seven. The early meetings, like any negotiations
based on good practices, focused on parties getting acquainted and exchanging
information, with Mandela spending time explaining ANCs history and
positions. Mandela astutely understood the need to build relationships and
credibility with people across the table before focusing on the substantive
issues.
When reaching the issues, they concentrated on four that by now were
thoroughly familiar to all the participants: ANCs continuation of the armed
struggle, ANCs alliance with the Communist Party, the goal of majority rule
(which was mostly about the needs of the white minority including their fears
that their private property would be nationalized), and racial reconciliation.
Each issue was discussed extensively during multiple meetings.
For the most intractable issue, majority rule with protections for the white
minority, Mandela avoided saying simply trust methe ANC is committed
to democratic reforms that would unite all the people and races of South
Africa. Mandela supported this commitment with a document he endorsed
thirty years earlier, the 1955 Freedom Charter. It was prepared by the South
African Congress Alliance that included the ANC. The Charters preamble
begins with, South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white . . .
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.194 and the entire document is based on principles of democracy and equality.
He emphasized that,  [T]he majority would need the minority. We do not
want to drive you to the sea.195
In response to their fears that the ANC and the Freedom Charter supported
blanket nationalization of the economy, Mandela indicated we favor more
even distribution of the rewards and any nationalization would occur for some
industries that are already monopolies.
He pointed out that he has not changed his mind since an article he wrote
in 1956 in which he said, the Freedom Charter was not a blueprint for
socialism but for African-style capitalism.196
As the intense and secret meetings continued, the country was still in
turmoil. The Government had re-imposed a state of emergency and domestic
and international pressures continued to mount with companies leaving South
Africa and the U.S. Congress passing a sanctions bill.
One evening in December 1988, Mandela was abruptly told to pack up his
belongings and, without any explanation, driven for an hour to a new prison,
Victor Verster. It turned out to be an upgrade in living conditions that was
better than he had ever experienced in his lifetime. He was moved to his own
house, a cottage, with a master bedroom and two guest rooms, swimming pool,
personal cook, and no bars on the windows although the walls were topped
with razor wire and guards were stationed at the entrance. He also could go for
walks, welcome frequent visitors, and hold private discussions. He was told
that this cottage would be his last home before becoming a free man. This
upgrade poignantly reminded him of the harsh conditions under which he has
been living for a quarter of a century and what he has been missing and longed
for.197
Soon afterwards, Mandela pressed to meet personally with President
Botha. Mandela prepared a memorandum to persuade Botha to meet and lay
the groundwork for the meeting. Mandela again demonstrated good
negotiation practices. He consulted key comrades on his side of the table
194
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because Although I know I was going ahead of my colleagues, I did not want
to go too far ahead and find that I was alone.198 The memorandum reflected
a thoughtful negotiation approach. He wanted the President to see they were
not wild-eyed terrorists, but reasonable men.199
He addressed the Governments preconditions for negotiationsthat the
ANC renounce violence, break with the communist party, and abandon the
call for majority rule. He explained how the first two issues were diverting
both sides from what he saw as the central issue dividing them: how to
reconcile two conflicting positions, (1) ANCs demand to adopt majority rule.
It is now apparent that Mandelas interests in a democracy had morphed into
a single position. Only when accepted, he said there would be peace and
stability. Mandela described the rejection of majority rule by the
government as a poorly disguised attempt to preserve power. (2) National
Governments demand to address the impact of majority rule on white South
Africa. The whites are insisting on structural guarantees that majority rule
will not mean domination of the white minority by blacks.200
He also understood how the sequencing of negotiations can affect progress
when he proposed that negotiations proceed in two stages: first, conditions for
negotiations must be created, and then actual negotiations can be conducted.201
In July 1989, Mandela was again starkly reminded of what he had
sacrificed for the freedom struggle when celebrating his seventy-first birthday
in prison. His entire family came to his cottage. It was the first time he was
together with his wife, children, and grandchildren. He realized that, It was a
deep, deep pleasure to have my whole family around me, and the only pain
was the knowledge that I had missed such occasions for so many years.202
Mandela finally had his meeting with President Botha. It was his only
meeting, lasted less than a half hour on July 5, 1989, and was mostly cordial.
Mandela described it as a breakthrough, not in terms of the substantive
negotiations but that Botha had finally cross[ed] the Rubicon. . . . Now I felt
there was no turning back.203
As negotiations were proceeding in the face of these reminders of the
missing personal pleasures, the unimaginable happened. President Botha
resigned in August 1989, as a result of a stroke. 204 A new president and
bargaining partner was sworn-in, F.W. de Klerk. Changing bargaining partners
198
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can sometimes create an opportunity to move negotiations forward. 205
Mandela, however, had no reason to think that this was a positive
development. Although the negotiations had been going slowly with Botha, de
Klerk was known by the ANC as a cipher. Nothing in his past seem[ed] to
hint at a spirit of reform.206 This change looked like a setback.
Mandela discovered that de Klerk was a pragmatist. As Mandela
continued to meet with the secret negotiation committee, he tried to channel
messages to de Klerk through the committee. To Mandelas great surprise, de
Klerk began systematically dismantling many of the building blocks of
apartheid, including dissolving many segregated facilities like beaches and
restaurants. He also released unconditionally seven former Robben Island
leaders including his close and long-term friend, Walter Sisulu. Mandela
conveyed his appreciation to de Klerk. Mandela understood the importance of
acknowledging progress in order to cultivate a positive negotiation
relationship.
President de Klerk set up a personal meeting with Mandela for December
13, 1989. Mandela, like any good negotiator, planned for the meeting. He
consulted extensively with a diverse range of colleagues including old friends
and new leaders, and prepared a lengthy letter to send to de Klerk in advance
of the meeting. The letter warrants a high grade for the way it set the tone,
addressed candidly controversial issues, and framed an agenda that considered
both sides priorities.207
He began the letter by praising President de Klerk for recently freeing
political prisoners, and then quickly moved ahead to identify conditions for
creating a proper climate for negotiations. Throughout the letter, he
meticulously presented his rationales for key points in contention.
The Government had persistently conditioned negotiations on ANC
suspending the armed struggle. Mandela understood that he had to address the
Governments priority in a way that might be acceptable to both sides. He
justified the ANCs armed struggle as purely a defensive measure against the
violence of the government. He gave this issue a sense of urgency while
framing it as a joint one when he stressed that, [A] mutually agreed-upon
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cease-fire to end hostilities ought to be the first order of business, for without
that, no business could be conducted.208
He forewarned de Klerk how Mandela viewed the Governments proposal
for group rights. He characterized it as a disguised form of minority rule
under which whites would hold firmly and defiantly to power and enforce
racial separation. It would make meaningless all talk of reconciliation and
justice.
He gave de Klerk encouragement. He labeled as important de Klerks
statement on reconciliation and seeking mutually acceptable solutions set
out in his inaugural address to Parliament. He described the message as having
a formidable impact inside and outside the country. These words imbued
South Africans and the rest of the world with hope for the birth of a new South
Africa. Mandela repeated his primary interest when he said the very first step
toward reconciliation is obviously dismantling apartheid . .
. . 209
Mandela linked de Klerks call for reconciliation to the countrys future.
Mandela wrote:
By reconciliation, in this context, was understood the situation where
opponents, and even enemies for that matter, would sink their
differences and lay down their arms for the purpose of working out a
peaceful solution, where the injustices and grievances of the past
would be buried and forgotten, and a fresh start made.210
He alerted de Klerk to Mandelas concern that the spirit of the inaugural
speech has not been in action lately,211 a comment that may be true as a good
practice or posturing as a tactic. Only de Klerk can determine whether
Mandelas statement can be justified or was a negotiation ploy that lacked
merit. .
Mandela tried to introduce an objective standard, as any good negotiator
should do when facing a distributive conflict. A standard that is independent
of the parties can become the basis for overcoming a conflict. Mandela cited a
detailed negotiation plan formulated by the ANC and approved by the
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Frontline States,212 the Non-Aligned Countries Conference, and almost all the
members of the Commonwealth of Nations. The plan was known as the Harare
Declaration of 1989. 213 It put the burden on the Government to eliminate
negotiation obstacles that it created.214 It recognized that peace and stability
was possible only when the system of apartheid has been eradicated and South
Africa has been transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial state.
It set out pre-conditions for negotiations (release prisoners, lift bans, end state
of emergency, etc.) and guidelines (transition to a democratic order, free
elections, etc.).215
At the time the negotiation plan was cited in the letter, however, it lacked
the full persuasive power of an objective standard. It had not yet been adopted
by a body independent of both sides. It was initially endorsed by sympathetic
groups. The Harare Declaration achieved objective standard status the day
after the December 13th meeting when it was adopted by the United
Nations. 216 The letter was delivered to Mr. de Klerk the day before their
meeting.
At the meeting, Mandela was surprised when he found de Klerk listening
and trying to understand his point-of-view. He wrote, This was a novel
experience.217 He appreciated the feeling that he was being hearda wellrecognized prerequisite for moving forward in negotiations. He noted that his
predecessors spent their time talking and trying to persuade rather than
listening and trying to understand.
Mandela addressed one of the Governments major proposals for meeting
its interests, the group rights proposal. Mandela clearly opposed it in his
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letter but he did not simply dismiss it during the meeting. He engaged in a
discussion of its merits, another good negotiation practice.
He explained how the proposal that no racial or ethnic group could take
precedence over any other appeared to preserve white domination. He said the
ANC did not struggle against apartheid for seventy-five years to defer to a
disguised form of it. He also cited for support a persuasive source independent
of him. Mandela quoted an editorial in a newspaper that was a mouthpiece of
the de Klerks Nationalist Party. The editorial suggested that the group rights
concept was an attempt to bring back apartheid through the back door.
Mandela said that if the paper of de Klerks party perceived the proposal that
way, he asked, rather than lectured, [H]ow did he think we regarded it?218
As any accomplished negotiator knows, citing independent sources respected
by the other side and asking questions to engage the other side can be more
persuasive than making partisan arguments.
Mandela recognized the good negotiation practice of de Klerk when he
did not argue with Mandela. Instead, de Klerk articulated the underlying
interests motivating the group rights proposal while recognizing shared
interests. He said, You know my aim is no different than yours. Your memo
to P.W. Botha said the ANC and the government should work together to deal
with white fears of black domination, and the idea of group rights is how we
propose to deal with it.219 Mandela was impressed with this thoughtful reply.
Mandela had to find a way to meet the other sides interests, to some
extent, as any astute negotiator knows. When de Klerk raised shared interests
in the whites being part of the countrys future, Mandela was ready to work
with de Klerk to jointly explore how to address this common concern, which
they tried to do later when preparing an interim constitution.220
Mandela next brought up the question of his freedom, and it is clear that
Mandela was then in a strong bargaining position to negotiate his terms of
release. 221 The country was ungovernable and internationally isolated. Key
political prisoners had already been released. Mandela was living in relative
comfort in his private prison cottage where he was told that this place would
be his last one before being freed. If you have any doubt that the bargaining
dynamic had changed, read the letter Mandela sent to de Klerk in advance of
this meeting. The letter was confidently and forcefully written. He did not
mince his words as he articulated conditions and terms necessary for any
negotiated resolution.222 Also, consider the unusual negotiation that took place
218
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two months later when de Klerk informed Mandela that he would be freed the
next day. In what is now viewed as a historically comical exchange, Mandela,
as a prisoner, tried to negotiate for another week in prison to properly prepare
for his own release while de Klerk, as the jailer, wanted him to leave the next
day.223
Mandela used this discussion about his release as an opportunity to make
the case for unbanning the ANC, lifting the state of emergency, releasing
political prisoners, and allowing exiles to return. If de Klerk did not unban the
ANC, Mandela reminded him that Mandela would be working for an illegal
organization and you must simply re-arrest me after I walk through those
gates.224 This re-arrest reframing helped de Klerk see the dispute from an
unappealing perspective. If these changes were not made, Mandelas freedom
and any resulting positive world reactions would be short-lived. It evoked the
unworkable status quo.
There were no surprises in the exchanges and the meeting ended as
expected, as an exploratory one. President de Klerk said, he would take all
that [Mandela] said under consideration . . . .225 Mandela left the meeting
thinking Mr. de Klerk seemed to represent a true departure from . . . the past.
. . . and was a man we could do business with.226
Less than two months later, President de Klerk stunned the country and
the world on February 2, 1990, when he gave his now famous unbanning
speech in which he met Mandelas key preconditions for negotiations and
announced that he would be released unconditionally.227
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